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Prometheus, Hermes,
And Other Voices

Giampiero Comolli, Alessandro Dal Lago,
Maurizio Ferraris, Francesco Leonetti,
Pier Aldo Rovatti

Excerpted from a roundtable discussion held in Milan in 1987 upon publication of
Prometeoe Hermes. Colpae originenell'immaginariotardo-modernoby Carlo Formenti.
Napoli: Liguori editore, 1987
Abstract
The essay has two parts: the first deals mainly with epistemological themes, the second
with theoretical-political subjects.
In the first chapter the author sketches the general outlines of the book, which can
be linked to a project of radicalization of the metaphor of weak thought. This involves
"taking the metaphor literally," in the sense that the modern subject should not limit itself
to recounting its own decline, but should agree to step aside, to leave the floor to images.
Nevertheless, this is not an invitation to abandon the way of the logos,of modern discursive
and instrumental reason, to embark on the road of the ineffable, of mysticism, and of
contemplation, but rather to grasp the ambiguity of the process of secularization, to discover
how this is preparing the return of ancient mythical figures: Prometheus and Hermes.
The themes of the second chapter, which delineates the characteristics of the new
Prometheus, are the Marxian category of second nature, revisited from an historical point
of view as an artificial environment that shirks human understanding and the human
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project; and the paradox of a productive subject that, while it disposes of modern technological powers, is forced to pay, to a greater extent than in any other epoch, the symbolic
debt of original sin, that human gesture took possession of Nature .
The Promethean utopia of reconciliation with a Nature that has been completely
absorbed by human sociability appears disarmed before the late-modern evolution of
science and technology. We are in the era of Hermes, which the author describes in the
third chapter, beginning with several key concepts elaborated by scientists and
philosophers such as Prigogine, Thom, Serres, and Bateson. Hermes is the golden boy
who teaches us to seize occasions in a world in which disorder and fortuitousness are
increasing . He represents the knowledge of the premises, of circumstance, of the uncertain,
he is the power of the "micro."
The second part, divided into two chapters, follows the road that leads from Prometheus to Hermes, viewed as a transformation of the modes of political rationality: from
the "tragic" rigor of the opposition friend/enemy to the ambiguity of the systemic conception of politics, which seems able to overcome the antagonistic form of conflicts. In the
first chapter the author develops a critique of Rene Girard's anthropological theories: the
persistence of the sacred, associated with the decline of its structural apparatus (secularization), is the element that constitutes a reflection on modern political violence. The last
chapter-which makes reference to the labor theories of the 1970s, the systemic cybernetic
functionalism of Luhmann, and the culture of the "greens" -traces a path for an adequate
distancing from the "sacrificial" results of the revolutionary project.

Pier Aldo Rovatti: Formenti's book has the ability to record, to
sensitize, a number of theoretical events that have occurred in the
last ten or fifteen years. This certainly describes the book, but in
itself it is insufficient. If the book is a sort of sensory organ for what
has happened in theory, or in a part of theory, it also intends to
advance a point of view, a project of reflection: a modification,
we might call it, of the usual way of thinking. In the main, I agree
with this proposal.
A critique can begin to grow out of the means and the consequences we can derive from this modification. I found a sort of
double movement in the book towards which we might orient the
discussion. On one hand, and I think this is the sense of the
reference, however cautious, to "weak thought," there is a loosening and a distancing-a
movement away from violence, from
forms of theory that involve violent elements, in short, a "relaxation of antagonism." There is also a taking of distance from these
forms: the dual concept of the title, Prometheus and Hermes, can
also be read in this light. Loosening/distancing from the violent
elements represented by unity, by the omnia in unum (in Serres'
sense in Rome).
Along with this movement, however, we also find the necessity of "remythicization": the positive suggestion of a reemergence
of the sacred, in a critical relation compared to the usual debates
on secularization.
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To me, in short, the marriage of these two movements seems
difficult: the loosening, with its suitable images, and the
reemergence of the sacred, which evidently implies that something
unknown will appear on the scene, something which is extraneous
to us, invisible, and which thus perhaps cannot be assumed directly within an image or within the imaginary.
When in the book, for example, it is assumed that theory can
fluctuate in accord with the fluctuations of the physical world, we
find a sort of identification between modes of thinking about reality
and modes of being in reality. But if that's the case, I don't see
how the element of the "sacred" can intervene in this hypothesis
of identification. Either it must be rethought in another way, or
it constitutes a real contradiction.

GiampieroComolli:One of the merits of Formenti' s book is to show
how we are faced today with the persistence of a mythical universe.
The secularization of the post-modem, or better, late-modem
world, is not pure and linear. Rather it gives rise to the labyrinthine
emergence of myths, images, figures, the presence of sacrality.
Secularization, therefore, as a form of remythicization: in the social
field, in the field of knowledge, and in the sciences, we are witnessing the birth of new mythical figures. Prometheus and Hermes
are among us once more.
It seems to me that Formenti' s book helps us understand how
this manifestation of myths, of images, also involves an alteration
of the status of their reality [statutodi realta].These images cannot
be taken as pure and simple images. From the first page of the
book, when he speaks about the metaphor of "weak thought,"
Formenti tells us it is necessary to take the metaphor not allegorically, but "literally." Now it seems to me this proposal regards not
only weak thought. It is late-modem myth in its entirety that has
acquired a different form of reality, becoming, let's say, more real.
Figures, metaphors, images are not-or are no longer only-signs
of language, signifiers that stand for an absent reality; they no
longer belong to the universe of communication, but instead enter
the universe of the symbol. And the symbol is understood here in
the sense of putting together, recomposing fragments of separate
realities. It therefore no longer appears as a significant term, but
rather as a form of being, of reality.
Accepting this meaning of the symbol, one can go so far today
as to say that an analogy exists between consciousness and being:
the structures of thought are revealed to be homologous to those
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of reality. Hermes is not an invention of our imagination, but
"exists," in the sense that reality today assumes, or can assume,
among others, also the form of Hermes. And therefore, in order
to know and to act in reality, we must know how to think like
Hermes, to be Hermes. Like Hermes, Formenti's book also wants
to be messenger and "psyco-pomp": the guide of souls towards
the host of late-modem images.
I think, however, that in order to be able to find one's way
among such a multitude without getting lost in the labyrinth of
images, one also needs to know how to distinguish them, to
recognize their differences, and it is with regard to this differentiation that the road traced by Formenti still seems imprecise,
uncertain. Let me give an example. Formenti speaks about the
need to reduce the antagonism based on the opposition friend/
enemy. This opposition derives from the persistence of the necessity of sacrifice, on which sacrality is based. The persistence of
sacrifice informs us that secularization has not allowed us to escape
sacrality. Remythicization,
seen by Formenti as a positive
phenomenon, goes along with resacralization (the necessity of
"enemies" and of their sacrifice), from which Formenti wants to
distance himself. Here then there's a problem, which regards precisely the reality status of images. The opposition friend/enemy
collapses to the extent that one myth is born of another. The
"other" is sacrificed since he no longer appears to be a man, but
rather a human subspecies, a near-animal, a "not-man, but only
enemy." But the moment I consider the other, literally, as a harmful
animal, I am justified in killing, in making a sacrifice. In sacrifice,
therefore, we also have an employment of literal metaphors. And
the persistence of the sacred, the diffusion of new forms of sacrifice, derives from the fact that images are sacrificed by taking
them literally. These sacrificed images are represented as realities
that cast a spell over the subject, that overcome it and destroy it.
In the opposition friend/enemy, the subject is overwhelmed by
an image that appears to be real. It might be necessary here to
introduce the notion of "fantasma," a form of presentation of a
"para-real" image that coincides neither with the image of the
metaphor nor with that of the symbol.
For, to conclude quickly, I also believe that between metaphor
and symbol there cannot be one and the same reality status [statuto
di realta]. If the symbol is real and it places us in a homology
between being and knowing, the fact remains that being does not
coincide with knowing (except in "extreme" philosophies, like
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Zen, which would put us on another, still more distant road) .
Therefore, one can't simply or with impunity leave the universe
of the sign to "symbolize oneself" in the real. Even in a symbolic
means of recomposition within the real, the metaphor always
remains sign, distinct in its tum from "fantasma."
To enter into the late-modem mythic universe it seems necessary, therefore, to distinguish between the different forms of
images and myths that we meet. But how do we distinguish them?
Distinguishing, in fact, is essentially a conceptual, abstract, and
anti-mythical operation, a form of thought that forces us to leave
just that world of images into which we want to or must enter.
The way of distinguishing, and the form of conceptualization,
therefore, must also change. But how? By employing images
within concepts, Formenti tells us. So one can no longer distinguish between concepts and images. In this way the philosophy
of difference (on which the Western logosis based) would end up
caught in an unending spiral between image and concept (where
the "between" would no longer be a difference but the constant
annulment of difference). Formenti's book makes us reflect on the
enigma of this mythic spiral.

FrancescoLeonetti: I feel you two have very keenly investigated
several points : the sacred, metaphor, myths. I would like to insist
on these, but above all through a more general examination of
the problem the book presents, in my opinion.
I believe the book utilizes, or wants to use, or wants to make
use of, anthropological time, in the current absence of an historical
project. It does this, of course, by showing the protracted incidence
of the imaginary; but I would say that it feels the effects of this
absence, this void so strongly that it calls into play several rather
unexpected elements in theoretical discourse.
On the other hand, it seems that the book displays that point
of view we are all familiar with-a traditional one in leftist criticism,
and especially in critical Marxism, where in criticizing competing
theorists one also uses them, or alternatively one tries to connect
as much as possible and relate to one's own position that which
theorists on the other side of the fence have advanced. These
constant comparisons operate throughout the book and display
a very precise and important review survey. This is true, for example, also with regard to Girard, from whom comes the most plausible influence, on the sacred. But it seems to me that even Girard's
influence is not exhaustive. Formenti has produced a book that's

DIFFERENT/A

244

very sophisticated, challenging, intricate, and one wonders just
how conscious he is of this, or whether he's a little bit sorcerer's
apprentice, nothing bad intended, we all are a little ....
One notices that, as in Girard' s case--not to speak of the critiques of excellent theoretical texts like Luhmann' s and Bateson' s
and Serres', or perhaps of more remote works like Kerenyi' s, or
questionable works, like Capra' &-there's always a desire to
criticize and at the same time to thoroughly examine current positions; since today the discourse of the theoretical left of the past
no longer has any certainties, any foundations. One continues to
do it purely as hypothesis, as the prolongation of a choice which
today is impossible for all of us: linking theoretical arguments of
different extraction to one of our basic materialistic positions which
has kept its same constants, while really this position itself is at
stake and demands a return to theoretical materialism on the
essential points . Formenti draws out and augments the stakes.
Well, what happens then? As I see it, in the most interesting
part of the book, Formenti postulates a certain relationship between two moments of order and disorder. Order isn't something at
whose margins disorder exists--patrolled by a new science or a
new philosophy of science--and there isn't even a basic disorder,
as there in fact is in the new sciences, on top of which human
mental representation establishes laws and reasons . For Formenti,
however, there are two components that, though not in a dialectic
relationship, are nevertheless fundamental. He presents these as
"diurnal and nocturnal," and he pursues them in various ways,
always with a certain instability since in effect the book isn't
monolithic or developed in an explicit fashion. In my opinion,
then, there's a sort of dualism, and this creates the need to offer
alternatives, by showing that everything is determined but that,
in effect, within this fixity there is no stability. This is a common
philosophical-scientific assumption, but in Formenti' s discourse
it still manages to have a philosophical-political force. This is a
possible reading that emerges every so often from the book, but
at other times it gets tangled up in the direct debate with the texts
it examines.

Maurizio Ferraris: I would like to emphasize three points related
to the first part of the book, the epistemological-philosophical
part, that appear to be of great importance for what we could
define as the link between Hermes and hermeneutics.
The first is very general, and is partly connected to what
Leonetti has already said. Prometheus and Hermes examines the
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transition from Prometheus to Hermes, which is like saying from
tragedy to interpretation. Now Leonetti is right when he says that
the way this transition is treated in the book is mainly anthropological, and at bottom doesn't sufficiently take into account the
philosophy of history and of theology implicit in this transition.
In short, the question is dodged: Why, with what motives, and
pursuing what ends, did there occur this historical passage from
a Promethean epoch to a hermeneutic one (with all the possible
modulations in the Prometheus/Hermes alternation, starting with
modern/post-modern)?
The second point is closely related to the first. The fact that
the transition from Prometheus to Hermes is not sufficiently considered as an historical progression implies a limited mediation
between the two, as if Hermes were the simple antithesis of Prometheus, and not rather his Aufhebung, so to speak, that which at
the same time surpasses and preserves in itself what came before,
Prometheus. In this way the transition to interpretation doesn't
purely and simply exclude tragedy; rather, it assumes it and at
the same time reelaborates it like its own opposite foundation. In
short, it appears that the Prometheus/Hermes polarity, which is
treated with great clarity and persuasiveness, is expressed in excessively dualistic terms.
Alongside this dualism, and this is the third and last point, it
seems to me a certain positivistic aura still needs to be emphasized.
In Formenti' s discourse, epistemological transformations constitute both the point of departure and the last instance that governs
an analysis that involves the anthropological study of collective
imagination . Now why must science have this role as the instance
of last appeal? Where does it get such authority, in comparison,
say, with philosophy, with art, or with history? These considerations obviously do not point to a single shortcoming in Formenti' s
analyses, but rather to a comprehensive system within which
these analyses are inscribed (I'm thinking especially of Serres and
Thom), and in which one recognizes this quality, in my view
positivistic, of the epistemological moment .

Alessandro Dal Lago:I will limit myself to a few considerations on
the relationship sacred/secularization, which in my opinion is one
of the central aspects of the book. First, I agree with the outline
traced by Formenti: from the tragic foundation, which Formenti
reconstructs through Girard, to the fact that the sacred, as it becomes inflated , circulates, becomes currency and then dissolves.
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This is the problem that returns in the book's conclusion. This is
the theme of secularization, which needs to be seen together with
the production of images as characteristic of the new knowledge
(a knowledge that is not imaginary but the creator of images,
which seems to replace classical rationality) and therefore characteristic of a presumed re-mythicization.
Now without getting into Maurizio Ferraris's comments on
history of philosophy, I think the theme of secularization poses
important interpretive problems. We're used to thinking of secularization as a sort of drying up of the sources of the sacred,
while instead it appears to be a dispersion, a disintegration of the
religious factor in modern life. I think that the notion of secularization, not only in philosophic terms but also in the experience
of daily life, is more complex, and that it excludes a radical dualism
such as sacrality/rationalization. Secularization takes on an ambiguous form. In the first place, it is the decline of religious authority,
the end of the Church's grip on the formation of the imaginary
and of experience. In the second place, this loosening involves a
rebirth of religious experience. If we look at recent empirical
studies on this theme, for example Garelli's, we find that secularization (the Church's loss of influence) produces phenomena such
as the growth of fundamentalist groups, or the return to fashion
of archaic, Eastern, or magical religious practices. The two things
go together. It's difficult to say whether the rebirth of fundamentalism is a revival of the religious or an echo of the disintegration
of religious culture.
This problem, which we could call the post-modernity of beliefs, runs parallel to another distinction posed by Formenti' s book,
that is, the breakdown of the friend/enemy relationship. To the
extent to which the friend/enemy opposition is generalized, as
Formenti shows, in the whole social world, in all areas of experience, it gets inflated and collapses. Antagonisms are substituted
by fragmentation, nonconflictual pluralism.
I would like therefore to pose a question to the book's author,
to conclude this first comment. If this is the evolution that Formenti
reconstructs (and correctly, I might add), then why do the
categories he uses come above all from scientific discourse? How
does he legitimize the privilege ascribed to scientific discourse,
even if it is the critical version of the new rationality, a version
that renounces positivism, as Ferraris has already said? Why
privilege scientific over other forms of discourse, literary discourse
for example, or certain aspects of contemporary philosophy, which
address this situation of ambiguity in an equally radical way? After

ROUNDTABLE

247

all, at the end of the book even the author finds a way out through
a type of thinking that is nonscientific: Eastern Philosophy.

Francesco Leonetti: It seems to me that many themes have been
sufficiently and well discussed in this first round. Formenti has
of course only begun to develop the arguments of his discourse,
which he will continue to explain in future works.
I would simply like to make an observation directed both to
Ferraris, who spoke about positivism, and also to Dal Lago, who
asked explicitly why the theoretic-scientific discourse prevails over
the philosophic one.
Ferraris should really specify what he means. We all know
that positivism means reference to the fact, but after positivism, in
the theoretical-scientific field, there's neo-positivism, which deals
with linguistics rather than with facts, with a very marked displacement; and then there's post-positivism, which is characterized by
the assertion that there is no sure experimental verification. In
this sense, then, I find it interesting-which
is not to say successful
or settled, but interesting-that
the movement of the relationship
between the two fields (scientific and philosophical) that exists in
Formenti's book, always refers to the neo-positivists or even to
the post-positivists.
Alessandro Dal Lago: And in reference to the question I posed?
FrancescoLeonetti:It remains open. With the clarification, however,
that you pose a contradiction, whereas it seems to me that, precisely because we're no longer talking about positivism but, if
anything, about post-positivism, the movement between the two
camps is useful, and interesting, Formenti' s book being a case in
point.
Pier Aldo Rovatti: I have the impression that Carlo Formenti is
moving in the direction of a physical-politics. The assertion of a
physical-politics involves, however, an adherence to a philosophy,
and this philosophy must be capable of mirroring this physicalpolitics. In my view, this direction clashes with the existence of
a philosophy which instead recognizes the crisis of the idea of
truth, and poses problems of distancing, of removal, of metaphor,
of image, etc.
Alessandro Dal Lago:I wanted to emphasize that, as is pointed out
in Formenti' s book, one of the most interesting aspects of the new
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philosophy of science is that scientific discourse is no longer protected by an epistemological-rhetorical wall, as it was in classical
positivism and in neo-positivism. It is well known that positivism
is not so much a form of knowledge based on empirical understanding (one thinks of the human and social sciences at the end
of the nineteenth century), but is rather a rhetoric of empirical
knowledge . Formenti rightly emphasizes the anthropological
background of scientific discourse, taking the origins of knowledge
back to what I call the "tragic model," and therefore to a founding
sacrificial act. This analysis seems completely acceptable. But a
problem arises. When the positivistic wall crumbles, reflection on
science is "de-positivized" (as in the authors cited by Formenti,
Prigogine and others, who refer to Valery, Bergson, etc.).
Shouldn't the hermeneutical field of discourse on rationality then
be broadened to include literature, poetry, narrative, as has already occurred in other sectors of contemporary philosophy (I'm
thinking of Ricoeur)?

Maurizio Ferraris : I also want to clarify briefly something referred
to by Leonetti, who rightly pointed out the obscure and imprecise
points in my comment. I agree, there isn't a single positivism,
but many different modulations of the same idea; Serres'
positivism is different, of course, from that of Carnap or of Comte.
More precisely, Serres' positivism does not consist of imposing
everywhere and indiscriminately a cult of facts and of verifiability,
but rather of attempting an alliance between natural science and
science of the spirit, oriented mainly towards the former .
Pier Aldo Rovatti: In any case the fact remains that there is an
important difference between the idea of science that Heidegger
had and the idea of science that we might have. The problem is,
what sorts of questions do we bring to bear on the new forms of
knowledge? If anything it's philosophy that appears to be behind
on this question and to use old models of thinking, expecting
truths from science, when instead we should probably ask science
for images and sketches of the imaginary that might not confirm
the identification between the technique and the metaphysics of
the subject.
Alessandro Dal Lago:It's true that philosophy, from a certain viewpoint, is incapable of confronting the new scientific subjects. After
all, the critique of positivistic metaphysics already existed in the
time of Whitehead and Bergson, who insist on the dynamic charac-
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ter of scientific knowledge. But when Heidegger, for example,
reflects on science, basing himself curiously enough on Heisenberg
and consequently on his age's most advanced reflections on contemporary science, he presents an image of scientific knowledge
that is somehow totalitarian, authoritarian, which the new reflections call into question. Here a problem arises: either Heidegger's
criticism reveals, despite everything, a metaphysical bias (a unitary
and nonproblematical image of science), or the new knowledge,
which is at the center of Formenti' s book, achieves a new form
of authority that today is more difficult to characterize.
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